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1. Extended Abstract 
 Contemporary philosophers of mathematics are deadlocked between two alternative ontologies 
for numbers: Platonism and nominalism. According to contemporary mathematical Platonism, numbers 
are real abstract objects, i.e. particulars which are nonetheless “wholly nonphysical, nonmental, 
nonspatial, nontemporal, and noncausal.”1 While this view does justice to intuitions about numbers and 
mathematical semantics, it leaves unclear how we could ever learn anything by mathematical inquiry. 
Mathematical nominalism, by contrast, holds that numbers do not exist extra-mentally, which raises 
difficulties about how mathematical statements could be true or false. Both theories, moreover, leave 
                                                          
1 Mark Balaguer, “Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/. 




inexplicable how mathematics could have such a close relationship with natural science, since neither 
abstract nor mental objects can influence concrete physical objects.2 
 The Thomist understanding of quantity as an accident inhering in concrete substances breaks 
this deadlock by granting numbers a foundation in extra-mental reality3 which explains why numeric 
expressions are relevant in natural science and how we come to know the truth or falsity of 
mathematical statements. Further, this kind of moderate realism captures the semantic advantages of 
the Platonists4 and the ontological parsimony of the nominalists (since for Thomists quantity is not a 
separate, free-standing ontological addition). Despite these advantages, the Thomistic understanding of 
number has been out of favor since the work of Cantor, who argued that actual infinities (regarded by 
Aristotelians as impossible) are required for modern developments in mathematics.5 This paper frees 
philosophers of mathematics to embrace the advantages of Thomistic realism by showing that Cantor’s 
understanding of actual and potential infinity is not the same as Aquinas’s, and that potential infinities 
(in Aquinas and Aristotle’s sense)6 can do all the work Cantor claims for actual infinities in modern 
mathematics.  
                                                          
2 Eugene P. Wigner, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. Richard Courant 
Lecture in Mathematical Sciences Delivered at New York University, May 11, 1959,” Communications on Pure and 
Applied Mathematics 13, no. 1 (1960): 1–14; R. W. Hamming, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics,” 
The American Mathematical Monthly 87, no. 2 (1980): 81–90; Arthur M. Lesk, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of 
Mathematics in Molecular Biology,” The Mathematical Intelligencer 22, no. 2 (March 1, 2000): 28–37, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03025372; Sundar Sarukkai, “Revisiting the ‘unreasonable Effectiveness’ of 
Mathematics,” Current Science 88, no. 30 (2005): 415–23; Arkady Plotnitsky, “On the Reasonable and 
Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in Classical and Quantum Physics,” Foundations of Physics 41, no. 3 
(March 1, 2011): 466–91, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9442-2; Roland Omnès, “Wigner’s ‘Unreasonable 
Effectiveness of Mathematics’, Revisited,” Foundations of Physics 41, no. 11 (November 1, 2011): 1729–39, 
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Aquino opera omnia 50 (Paris: Le Cerf, 1992), http://archive.org/details/operaomniaiussui02thom, 5.3. 
4 Richard Pettigrew, “Platonism and Aristotelianism in Mathematics,” Philosophia Mathematica 16, no. 3 (October 
1, 2008): 15–16, https://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkm035. 
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http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783662002544. 
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In the second half of the twentieth century there has been an ongoing fascination with the 
“unreasonable effectiveness” of mathematics in natural science.  In the predominant contemporary 
metaphysical accounts of mathematical beings, that effectiveness is indeed condemned to remain a 
mystery.  While the Thomist account, in which mathematical objects are abstractions from the real 
category of quantity, does a great deal to explain the effectiveness of mathematics in describing the 
physical world, it was broadly rejected due to seeming incompatibilities with nineteenth and twentieth 
century developments in the logical foundations of mathematics.  The most historically important claims 
of incompatibility, however, are apparent rather than real, and reflect limitations in the claimants 
understanding of both Aquinas’s views and the implicit metaphysics of mathematical formulae.  I show 
this by first situating the Thomist position within contemporary debates in philosophy of mathematics, 
second illustrating the need for quantity in motivating accounts of number rich enough for analysis, and 
third showing that Thomism is not incompatible with the mathematical analyst’s need for infinite sets. 
3. Formal and Material Mathematics 
3.1 Why should math have anything to do with matter? 
Wigner, who popularized the widely repeated notion of mathematics’ “unreasonable 
effectiveness,”7  describes it as “the miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for 
the formulation of the laws of physics” which “is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor 
deserve.”8 When Sarukkai revisited Wigner’s thesis, he observed that “The mysteriousness that is 
enshrined in the phrase ‘unreasonable effectiveness’ of mathematics reflects as much a confusion about 
                                                          
7 “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.” with almost 2,000 citations in Google 
Scholar; Hamming, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics”; Lesk, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of 
Mathematics in Molecular Biology”; Sarukkai, “Revisiting the ‘unreasonable Effectiveness’ of Mathematics”; 
Plotnitsky, “On the Reasonable and Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in Classical and Quantum Physics”; 
Omnès, “Wigner’s ‘Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics’, Revisited.” 
8 “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.,” 14. 




the mysteriousness of what mathematics is…as its applicability.”9 For Wigner, “mathematics is the 
science of skillful operations with concepts and rules invented just for this purpose…the principal 
emphasis is on the invention of concepts.”10  It is natural that pragmatic applicability to physics would 
seem wondrous on such a nominalist view of what mathematics is.  Even if mathematics is understood 
as more closely related to logic, it is unclear why it should be such a rich “tool for exploring the universe 
as we perceive it at present” given the fairly minimal constraint and assistance logic normally provides 
for theorizing.11   
One might expect less difficulty in understanding the applicability of mathematics for those with 
a realist understanding of mathematics in which “mathematical entities exist independently of humans 
just as trees and tables do” but “Platonism about mathematical entities is the dominant realist 
tradition” and “Platonic entities…do not have spatial or temporal characteristics.”12  More technically, 
Platonists take numbers to be abstract objects, “and abstract objects, platonists tell us, are wholly 
nonphysical, nonmental, nonspatial, nontemporal, and noncausal.”13  Unsurprisingly then, “Platonism, 
although popular among mathematicians and scientists, runs into serious problems when confronted 
with the applicability of mathematics”—human epistemic access and applicability to physics are both 
deeply mysterious for such entities.14  In response to this difficulty, Sarukkai proposes that 
“mathematics is a product of human imagination” but “grounded in our experience with the world” such 
as “the activity of counting and aggregating.”15  Since Sarukkai’s proposal grants a role for both objective 
ontology and human intellection, it is a kind of middle way between nominalist and Platonist accounts of 
                                                          
9 Sarukkai, “Revisiting the ‘unreasonable Effectiveness’ of Mathematics,” 417. 
10 Wigner, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.,” 2. 
11 Hamming, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics,” 90. 
12 Sarukkai, “Revisiting the ‘unreasonable Effectiveness’ of Mathematics,” 416. 
13 Balaguer, “Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” 
14 Sarukkai, “Revisiting the ‘unreasonable Effectiveness’ of Mathematics,” 416. 
15 Sarukkai, 417. 




mathematics which he suggests “functions like a language.”16 If “mathematics actually ‘arises’ from the 
world then the unnatural connection is no longer there, thereby diluting the puzzle as far as this relation 
is concerned.”17  Sarukkai’s proposal is reasonable given the epistemic and scientific mysteries created 
by nominalist and Platonist accounts of mathematics, but he fails to advert to the history or constraints 
of the middle way often vaguely categorized as “anti-nominalism” or “lightweight Platonism.”18 
3.2 Not just any matter will do 
 One of the principal philosophical arguments for mathematical Platonism is Frege’s contention 
that numbers function as proper names in mathematical discourse.19 After all, it seems that no concrete 
object could provide a referent for many important mathematical symbols: 
no Euclidean straight line, regular polygon, etc. can be instantiated in concrete objects, or can 
be used as description of concrete objects. In fact, in the age of the theory of relativity and of 
quantum mechanics, when it becomes justifiable to represent the universe as having a finite 
diameter and containing a finite number of elementary particles, and to conceive of space-time 
as having a curvature different from 0, which concrete object could be considered as a straight 
line without breadth and infinite in length having 0 curvature, or as an instantiation of a 
transfinite cardinal number greater than 2ℵ0?20 
 
If mathematical symbols are proper names for objects ,then, they must be the proper names of abstract 
objects.  Further, since it seems that mathematicians make truth claims about the referents of their 
symbols, this argument has been persuasive enough that many nominalists have become fictionalists.21 
Mathematics may be a language, as Sarukkai suggested, but considerations from philosophy of language 
                                                          
16 Sarukkai, 417. 
17 Sarukkai, 417. 
18 Øystein Linnebo, “Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, 2013, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/platonism-mathematics/. 
19 Bob Hale and Crispin Wright, The Reason’s Proper Study: Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of 
Mathematics (Clarendon Press, 2003), 7–8. 
20 Gianluigi Oliveri, A Realist Philosophy of Mathematics, Texts in Philosophy 6 (London: College Publications, 
2007), 82. 
21 Balaguer, “Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics.” 




seem to worsen rather than ease the difficulties philosophy of science faces in understanding the 
application of mathematics.   
 A potential escape route is charted by Pettigrew, who shows that neither formal nor semantic 
tests can discriminate between Platonist and free variable theories for interpreting mathematical 
language.22 Pettigrew’s free variable semantics is compatible with a Thomist understanding of the 
relationship between matter and mathematics since it ““posits as separate what is not separate, the 
very thing that the arithmetician and the geometer do,”23 with the axioms as the posits of that 
separation.  I will not give an account in this paper of the material grounds of that separating abstraction 
in rational psychology, focusing instead on the formal, metaphysical question of whether quantity has 
necessary and sufficient content for the objects of contemporary mathematics.  Sarukkai does hint, 
however, at Aquinas’s claim that mathematical understanding resolves to the imagination, averring that: 
There are innumerable examples of the importance of symbolic manipulation based on formal 
similarity. In fact, I would go to the extent of saying that the effectiveness of mathematization 
significantly depends on the power of symbols to act like pictures of ideas, concepts and events. 
The role of mathematics in the sciences seems to be essentially dependent on the possibility of 
using mathematical symbols as ‘pictures’. For example, we could look upon 1/2ab2 as the 
‘picture’ of kinetic energy. So even in contexts that are very different we can still recognize that 
picture and identify it with the kinetic energy of that object or system.24 
Plotnitsky, too, recognizes that any account of the development and effectiveness of mathematics must 
involve idealization, since we “disregard those features of [objects] that are not thus mathematically 
idealized”25—Aquinas would suggest that these are matter and motion.  This role for the imagination, 
however, must rely on real abstraction for its content, however, rather than mere representation, since 
                                                          
22 “Platonism and Aristotelianism in Mathematics,” 15–16. 
23 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Joe Sachs, 2nd edition (Santa Fe, N.M: Green Lion Press, 2002), bk. XIII.4 
(1078a22). 
24 Sarukkai, “Revisiting the ‘unreasonable Effectiveness’ of Mathematics,” 422. 
25 Plotnitsky, “On the Reasonable and Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in Classical and Quantum 
Physics,” 467. 




the mathematical ‘picture’ of kinetic energy also holds in quantum physics, where we cannot represent 
the underlying reality in our imaginations at all.26  Matter must be involved in the grounding of 
mathematics for it to work in physics, but the semantics of that work demand that it must be abstracted 
from matter itself.  This is exactly the account Aquinas gives of abstracting mathematicals from quantity, 
a real mode of being. 
3.3 The Goldilocks Problem 
 The difficulty for the Thomist, then, is not making sense of mathematics in the first act of the 
intellect but in the second.  Are the mathematicals abstracted from quantity really necessary for 
mathematical reasoning itself, or only for its application to physics?  If the latter, again a strange 
coincidence arises which suggests an unreasonable effectiveness.  Can the objects needed for 
mathematical analysis, like infinite sets, be abstracted from quantity or are they precluded by its being a 
real mode of being?  If the latter, it again seems that mathematics is working in two modes with their 
compatibility as an awkward and unexplained coincidence.  Both of these objections must be met for 
the Thomist position to regain currency in the philosophy of mathematics, despite the difficulties in 
which the others find themselves. 
4. Quantity is Necessary for Mathematics: A Ratio Measure 
 One concern repeatedly raised for the Thomist is whether mathematics really requires an extra-
mental foundation.  The arguments of the Fregean platonists against the nominalists, with which the 
Thomist can agree in part, are one possible avenue of response.  The difficulty can be put in a more 
acute form, however, internal to the Thomist project.  The Thomist says that there are three persons in 
God, ten categories which divide being, and a multitude of the heavenly host.  Aquinas may aver that 
these numbers are not the same as those of quantity,27 but what can he offer to ground the distinction?  
                                                          
26 Plotnitsky, 468. 
27 Aquinas, In Meta., 476 Bk. X, lect. 4, n. 1997. 




Not only do these values seem suspiciously like numerical quantities, but logical non-identity, which 
they surely presuppose, can be used to give definitions for the ordinal numbers which found 
mathematics.28  The unique claim Aquinas makes for magnitude, or real quantity, is that it “is said to be 
divisible into infinity” by the mathematical operation of division.29  This matters because mere sets are 
not enough for mathematical analysis:  the sets have serve as the basis for rings which define the 
operations on those sets.  As Stevens illustrated, the origin of the sets matters if the operations are to 
be meaningful.30 If numbers merely indicate nominal differences or ordering, multiplication and division 
will give meaningless results:  the set might be defined, but the ring is not defined on the set.  Division is 
undefined for transcendental multitudes:  there is no meaningful claim that can be made about half a 
divine person, half an angel (since they are simple), or half of a mode of being.  If mathematics is to 
include the operations of division and multiplication, it must define them on a ring, and that ring must 
be grounded in a set on which those operations make sense.  As Aquinas tells us, that set is continuous 
quantity, which is grounded in the fundamental divisibility of matter.  As such, quantity is necessary for 
mathematical objects—mere logical difference will not do. 
5. Quantity is Sufficient for Mathematics: Actual Potential Infinity 
 Cantor’s theory of sets, which most accept as the basis of contemporary mathematics, “requires 
a commitment to the existence of actual, completed infinities.”31  Perhaps unsurprisingly, both he and 
the subsequent traditions of mathematics and philosophy of mathematics understood this commitment 
                                                          
28 Rchard E. Hennessey, “Thomas Aquinas: Beyond Aristotle’s Aristotelian Conception of the Numerical,” After 
Aristotle (blog), April 1, 2014, https://afteraristotle.net/2014/04/01/thomas-aquinas-beyond-aristotles-
aristotelian-conception-of-the-numerical/. 
29 “Alius modus secundum quod infinitum dicitur ablatione et divisione, secundum quod magnitudo dicitur 
divisibilis in infinitum.” Aquinas, In Meta., 550 Bk. XI, lect. 10. 
30 Stanley Smith Stevens, “On the Theory of Scales of Measurement,” Science 103, no. 2684 (June 7, 1946): 677. 
31 Anne Newstead, “Cantor on Infinity in Nature, Number, and the Divine Mind,” American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 83, no. 4 (2009): 534. 




as “overthrow[ing] a long-standing scholastic and Aristotelian tradition.”32  If Aristotle’s arguments 
against the existence of actual infinities in nature were sound, then so much the worse for Aristotle’s 
entire philosophy:  completed infinities must be platonic objects.  I suggest, however, that the sense in 
which Cantor demanded that infinities be complete is not at odds with Aquinas’s scholasticism, and thus 
need not entail any rejection of the Aristotelian project.   
 Let us begin our analysis by examining the formal statements of set theory in its later, more 
precise formalization by Zermelo and Fraenkel.  They begin by borrowing from J.S. Mill the definition of 
a set as “the indefinite multitude of individuals denoted by a general name.”33  Mill in turn defines a 
general name as “capable of being truly affirmed, in the same sense, of each of an indefinite number of 
things.”34  They then define the successor relation:  for any set a, its successor a+ = a U {a} and at this 
point the Axiom of Infinity can be precisely stated:  (∃𝐴)[∅ ∈ 𝐴 & (∀𝑎 ∈ 𝐴)𝑎+ ∈ 𝐴].35  Cantor’s 
motivation for moving to this formulation, and his readiness to call it actual or completed infinity, is due 
to the contrast with what he considered informal constructions like [0,1,2,3…].  These open formulae, 
which suggest some process external to that explicitly denoted on the page, seemed insufficiently 
rigorous to Cantor.   
 The older formulation was a more natural fit for Cantor’s late-scholastic interlocutors, since it 
seems like a fair symbolic representation of Aquinas’s first sense of infinity, which he explicitly applies to 
number, since “any number is always given to succession by one, and thus number is by augmentation 
into infinity.”36  Thus it is a possible infinity, since the successor can be given, but is not already extant.  
                                                          
32 Newstead, “Cantor on Infinity in Nature, Number, and the Divine Mind.” 
33 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of the Principles of 
Evidence, and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, 3rd Ed, vol. 1 (London: J. W. Parker, 1851), 28. 
34 Mill, 1:24. 
35 Herbert B. Enderton, Elements of Set Theory (Academic Press, 1977), 68. 
36 “Semper enim cuilibet numero dato est apponere unitatem, et sic numerus est augmentabilis in infinitum.” 
Aquinas, In Meta., 550 Bk. XI, lect. 10. 




Each ordinal number enumerated within the set and the cardinality of the set as a whole are numerable, 
so they are subject to Aquinas’s argument that they must each be finite, since “nothing numerable is 
infinite, because the numerable must be passed through by number:  therefore no number is infinite.”37  
Cantor’s new formulation, however, asserted the existence of a complete extant set, presupposing 
rather than using the successor relation.  Is this not, then, the kind of infinite Aquinas found “repugnant 
to cognition” and unable to be understood?38  Where the ellipsis signified “potential infinite always 
consist[ing] in succession” is not the Axim of Infinity the posit of a number line lacking termini, and thus 
an actual infinite?39  Aquinas’s concern is that 
it is possible that our intellect should perfectly know in a certain manner the infinite continuum; 
but in no way discrete infinities, for the reason that it is not possible to understand many things 
through one species; and thence it is that if many things must be considered, it is necessary that 
one be known after another, and thus discrete quantity is known through the means of infinity.  
Whence if the infinite multitude should be known in act, it should follow that he would know 
the infinite through the way of infinity; that is impossible.40 
 
Since the Axim of Infinity asserts the existence of ℵo rather than ℝ, or in contemporary parlance discrete 
rather than continuous infinity, this might seem like an insuperable difficulty. 
 Cantor’s set theory and its further developments are, however, genuine breakthroughs in 
mathematics unknown to Aquinas.  Aquinas, living before the advent of analysis, was unaware of any 
                                                          
37 “nullum numerale est infinitum, quia numerale est pertransibile numerando: ergo nullus numerus est infinitus.” 
Aquinas, 551. 
38 “Infinitum autem, sicut repugnat cognitioni, ita et repugnat transitioni: infinitum enim nec cognosci nec transiri 
potest” Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, qq. 1-7., ed. P. Antoine Dondaine, Leonine, vol. 1.2, 
Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia 22 (Rome: Ed. di san Tommaso, 1970), 73, 
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9482m Q. 2, a. 9, co. 
39 “Dicendum, quod duplex invenitur infiniti distinctio. Uno modo distinguitur per potentiam et actum; et dicitur 
infinitum potentia quod semper in successione consistit, ut in generatione et tempore et divisione continui, in 
quibus omnibus est potentia ad infinitum, semper uno post aliud accepto; actu autem infinitum, sicut si 
poneremus lineam terminis carentem.” Aquinas, 1.2:75–76 Q.2, a. 10, co. 
40 “sic possibile est ut intellectus noster quodammodo infinitum continuum perfecte cognoscat; sed infinita 
discrete nullo modo, eo quod non potest per unam speciem multa cognoscere; et inde est quod si multa debet 
considerare, oportet quod unum post alterum cognoscat, et ita quantitatem discretam per viam infiniti cognoscit. 
Unde si cognosceret infinitam multitudinem in actu, sequeretur quod cognosceret infinitum per viam infiniti; quod 
est impossibile.” Aquinas, 1.2:73 Q. 2, a. 9, co. 




non-geometric means of bringing many numbers under a single act of understanding.  Note the way he 
assumes that discrete quantity is known by succession, one after another.  This is exactly what the 
formal statement of the Axiom of Infinity avoids, however:  the successor relation is understood 
formally, and so the set’s act of existence and its intelligibility are also singular.  This was Cantor’s 
achievement.  The idea of passing through the infinite set by actually using the successor relation is 
what Cantor wished to avoid.  The infinity is completed neither by an infinite actual enumeration nor, as 
in Peano Arithmetic, by an infinity of axioms.41  Instead, the mathematical object of discrete infinity can 
be abstracted, because Cantor has provided a method for doing so which does “not lead to cognition of 
a singular as insomuch as those things by which singulars are mutually distinguished, but only insomuch 
as their common nature.” 42  The definition of the infinite set that Cantor provides is not done by 
enumeration from the elements, nor does it give the distinguishing marks of those elements (their 
actual successions):  it only asserts that the set does actually contain all of the possible successors.  As 
such, for Aquinas it counts as a potential infinity, since the species before the mind is that of the set, not 
that of the elements.43  The set is not repugnant to cognition because there is no necessity to traverse it.  
The elements of the set are of course untraversable, and thus properly infinite, but it is not the elements 
which must be passed through to give a measure to the set:  Cantor’s infinite sets are measured by 
transfinite cardinals without enumeration, and therefore they are not actual infinities in Aquinas’s 
                                                          
41 Usually written as a single second-order axiom of induction, but which is equivalent to an infinite number of first 
order succession axioms. 
42 “sed similitudo rei recepta in intellectu, est absoluta a particularibus conditionibus, unde cum sic elevatior, est 
ductiva in plura. Et quia una forma universalis nata est ab infinitis singularibus participari, inde est quod intellectus 
quodammodo infinita cognoscit. Sed quia illa similitudo quae est in intellectu, non ducit in cognitionem singularis 
quantum ad ea quibus singularia ad invicem distinguuntur, sed solum quantum ad naturam communem;” Aquinas, 
De Veritate (v1), 1.2:73 Q. 2, a. 9, co. 
43 “inde est quod intellectus noster per speciem quam habet apud se non est cognoscitivus infinitorum nisi in 
potentia;” Aquinas, 1.2:72 Q. 2, a. 9, co. 




metaphysical sense.44 This is precisely the possibility Aquinas allows for, though his intended model is 
the continuum rather than discrete infinity: 
If some infinite were known through the way in which it is infinite, in no way could it be 
perfectly known; if however it should be known not through the way [in which] it is infinite, then 
he will be able to know it perfectly:  because the ratio [notion] of infinity befits quantity, 
according to Aristotle in the first book of the Physics, and every quantity has from its own ratio 
an order of parts; it follows that now when it is apprehended part after part  the infinite would 
be known through the way [in which it is] infinite.45 
Infinity actually befits quantity, because quantity gives a way to bring the infinite under a single species, 
the line segment or surface. 
 Beyond an analogy between Cantor’s infinite discrete set and Aquinas’s understanding of the 
continuum, there are other reasons to suppose that Aquinas would be pleased rather than displeased 
with Cantor’s advance.  He recognizes, for instance, that mathematical relationships (namely equality) 
can exist among infinities: “Just as a certain finite is equal to a certain finite, thus an infinite is equal to 
another infinite.”46  Outside of Cantor-inspired set theory, however, there is no known way to formalize 
and prove this fact.  Further, Aquinas recognizes inductive results in number theory: 
 
If odd numbers are added to unity in order, the same form of number is always produced.  
Suppose, if one is added to three, which is the first odd they make four, which is a square 
number:  to which again if the second odd, namely five, is added it makes nine, which again is a 
square number, and thus always into infinity.  But in even numbers it always makes a different 
form.  For if unity is added to binary, it makes ternary, which is a triangular number; to which 
again if quaternary, which is the second even, is added, it makes septenary, which is of 
septangular form, and thus into infinity.47 
                                                          
44 “infinitum proprie est, quod mensurando pertransiri non potest. Tot ergo modis dicitur infinitum, quot modis 
dicitur intransibile.” Aquinas, In Meta., 550 Bk. XI, lect. 10. 
45 “si aliquod infinitum cognoscatur per viam per quam est infinitum, nullo modo perfecte cognosci potest; si 
autem cognoscatur non per viam infiniti, sic perfecte cognosci poterit: quia enim infiniti ratio congruit quantitati, 
secundum philosophum in I Phys., omnis autem quantitas de sui ratione habet ordinem partium; sequitur quod 
tunc infinitum per viam infiniti cognoscatur, quando apprehenditur pars post partem.” Aquinas, De Veritate (v1), 
1.2:73 Q. 2, a. 9, co. 
46 “sicut quoddam finitum est aequale cuidam finito, ita infinitum est aequale alteri infinito.” Aquinas, 1.2:52–53 Q. 
2, a. 3, ad 4. 
47 “si supra unitatem impares numeri per ordinem adduntur, semper producitur eadem figura numeralis. Puta, si 
supra unum addantur tria, qui est primus impar consurgunt ipsum quatuor, qui est numerus quadratus: quibus 





In Robinson Arithmetic, without Peano’s infinite axioms or Cantor’s so-called actually-infinite sets, all of 
number theory’s claims about particular numbers can be proven, but not the inductive results which go 
on into infinity.48  If Aquinas is committed to these claims about number theory being real mathematical 
results, then, he is implicitly committed to the Axiom of Infinity. 
6. Conclusion 
 Not only is the Thomist best-equipped to explain the origin and application of mathematical 
concepts in quantity, he can explain why quantity is both necessary and sufficient for the mathematical 
beings of analysis.  In abstraction from matter and motion that resolves the imagination, mathematicals 
are well-suited for physics.  In providing a unique ground for ratio numbers, they ground the rings which 
define the range of mathematical operations.  With Cantor’s axiomatic treatment they ground the 
infinite sets necessary for analytic proofs, contrary to Cantor’s own misunderstanding of the scholastic 
tradition.  Thomism should be a live and even leading option in the philosophy of mathematics. 
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